Intent as a dichotomic agent between folk psychology and identity theory :: essays research papers

The framework of choice for the contemporary philosophers of mind is physicalism, a position that integrates the study of mind within the ‘scientific’ human knowledge regulated by the laws of matter and energy. In this paper, I will provide arguments that support the incompatibility between two different theories of mind, namely mind-brain identity theory (IT) and folk psychology (FP) on logical grounds. The first part of the essay will familiarize the reader with the basic concepts, definitions and some of the key arguments employed by IT and FP. Let us begin with a summary about identity theory. Simply put this theory holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. To make use of an example, our experience of pain it is exactly reflected by a corresponding neurological state in the brain, i.e. C-fibres firing. From this point of view, the mind is the brain – they are identical. However, this identity is only contingent, i.e. its confirmation relies upon ulterior scientifical advancements. There are two types of identity theories: type-identity theory and token-identity theory. The later is just a moderate derivation of the former, by proposing a not so radical claim, i.e. that supports the identity of particular instances (tokens) of mental states (e.g. a particular pain ) with correspondent particular brain states. Type-identity theory on the other hand, assumes a stronger position of strict identity, i.e. that pain as a type of mental state, is identical with a particul ar brain state. In this paper I refer to identity theory as type-identity theory (IT). The initiator of this theory was U.T. Place, and his innovative essay “Is Counsciousness a Brain Process'; (1956) greatly influenced J.J.C. Smart. Consequently, in “Sensations and Brain Processes'; (1959) Smart asserts that “processes reported in sensation statements are in fact processes in the brain';. IT theorists object against the “physical irreducibility'; of mental states, i.e. that they are something misterious and eluding physical laws, and so they deny the existence of the soul or counsciousness as something irreducible physical. Smart, a converted IT from behaviorist theory, doesn’t consider sensations or mental states as behaviors or dispositions, but type-identical with brain states; so pain, belief, desire are nothing else but neural firing, chemical release and whatever else might happen in the brain at that moment. Therefore, just as lightning is nothing but an electrical discharge, so pain just is C-fibers firing in the brain. Intent as a dichotomic agent between folk psychology and identity theory :: essays research papers The framework of choice for the contemporary philosophers of mind is physicalism, a position that integrates the study of mind within the ‘scientific’ human knowledge regulated by the laws of matter and energy. In this paper, I will provide arguments that support the incompatibility between two different theories of mind, namely mind-brain identity theory (IT) and folk psychology (FP) on logical grounds. The first part of the essay will familiarize the reader with the basic concepts, definitions and some of the key arguments employed by IT and FP. Let us begin with a summary about identity theory. Simply put this theory holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. To make use of an example, our experience of pain it is exactly reflected by a corresponding neurological state in the brain, i.e. C-fibres firing. From this point of view, the mind is the brain – they are identical. However, this identity is only contingent, i.e. its confirmation relies upon ulterior scientifical advancements. There are two types of identity theories: type-identity theory and token-identity theory. The later is just a moderate derivation of the former, by proposing a not so radical claim, i.e. that supports the identity of particular instances (tokens) of mental states (e.g. a particular pain ) with correspondent particular brain states. Type-identity theory on the other hand, assumes a stronger position of strict identity, i.e. that pain as a type of mental state, is identical with a particul ar brain state. In this paper I refer to identity theory as type-identity theory (IT). The initiator of this theory was U.T. Place, and his innovative essay “Is Counsciousness a Brain Process'; (1956) greatly influenced J.J.C. Smart. Consequently, in “Sensations and Brain Processes'; (1959) Smart asserts that “processes reported in sensation statements are in fact processes in the brain';. IT theorists object against the “physical irreducibility'; of mental states, i.e. that they are something misterious and eluding physical laws, and so they deny the existence of the soul or counsciousness as something irreducible physical. Smart, a converted IT from behaviorist theory, doesn’t consider sensations or mental states as behaviors or dispositions, but type-identical with brain states; so pain, belief, desire are nothing else but neural firing, chemical release and whatever else might happen in the brain at that moment. Therefore, just as lightning is nothing but an electrical discharge, so pain just is C-fibers firing in the brain.